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SECURITIES REGULATION: INSURANCE
POLICY ENDORSEMENT CREATING AN
INDIRECT INTEREST IN PROFIT SHARING
HELD NOT A SECURITY
In Olpin v. Ideal National Insurance Co.,' the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit declined jurisdiction over claims arising from
a complex life insurance policy endorsement, holding that the
endorsement did not constitute a "security" or an "investment
contract" as those terms are used in the Securities Act of 1933, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Investment Company Act
of 1940.2 The endorsement established a policyholder's bonus fund
to which the insurance company would annually add variable
amounts within fixed minimum and maximum levels for each unit
of specified life insurance sold. As early as 1948, two insurance
companies began issuing policies which contained an endorsement
providing that in consideration for payment of a premium higher
than that for regular life insurance policies, the insurance companies
would, through 1967, annually set aside in a special fund not less
than $1.00 and not more than $2.00 per thousand dollars of specified
life insurance for policies remaining in full force through 1967. The
fund thereby created would earn two and one-half per cent annual
compound interest. Life insurance included within the specified
category included all regular policies except those to which the
endorsement was attached and group life insurance? The actual
amount to be set aside within the permissible range was determined
on an annual basis by the board of directors, and no limitations were
placed upon their investment of the resulting fund. This scheme thus
provided two means through which the prospective policyholder
anticipated profits: increased sales of specified life insurance and
election by the board to deposit an amount near the maximum limit
of $2.00 per thousand. At the end of the accumulation period, each
1. 419 F.2d 1250 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1074 (1970).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-hh (1964); 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I to a-
52 (1964). See generally I L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 483-89, 496-501 (2d ed. 1961).
3. The opinion neither states the amount of the increased premium nor explains the
rationale for the two exceptions.
4. In determining the precise amount between $1.00 and $2.00 the directors considered
previous earnings from the investment of the additional premiums, the size of the accumulated
fund, and the interest thereon. 419 F.2d at 1261.
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policyholder would receive his pro rata share of the bonus fund with
compound interest. No prior distributions were permitted except that
upon the death of the insured the designated beneficiary would
receive the pro rata share of the policy in the accumulated fund as
of the date of death Since the endorsement was illegal under Utah
insurance statutes, Ideal National Insurance Company became
liable for all obligations created by the endorsement. Upon learning
of this illegality, Ideal gave each policyholder a choice of four
options to obtain a refund of the premiums paid on the
endorsement Under any option the underlying policies would be
continued at a reduced premium. The plaintiffs, composed of
policyholders whose endorsements were in full force at the end of the
accumulation period and of policyholders who had surrendered their
endorsements under one of the options set forth by Ideal, brought
this class action in which they sought specific performance of the
endorsement or, in the alternative, damages. The complaint alleged
that the endorsement constituted a "security" within the meaning of
the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Acts of. 1933 and
19348 and that Ideal therefore was an "investment company" within
the meaning of the Investment Company Act of 1940W The plaintiffs
further contended that Ideal had failed to register the securities and
had made untrue statements of material facts or omitted to state
material factsregarding the sale. Finding that Ideal bore the entire
risk of loss under the endorsement, 10 the court of appeals affirmed
the Utah district court's holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a
claim within the jurisdiction of the district court t
The Securities Act of 193312 includes within its broad definition
of a "security" any "investment contract" and any "certificate of
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement.'1 3
5. Id. at 1251.
6. The opinion does not explain the nature of the statutory violation.
7. Under the four options the holder would receive either: (1) the total amount of the
additional premiums paid on the endorsement; (2) the amount of paid-up life insurance which
the premiums would have purchased at the age of the policyholder on the maturity date of
the endorsement or upon execution of a release of all possible claims against Ideal; (3) a
specified sum of money; or (4) a comparable amount of paid-up life insurance. 419 F.2d at
1253.
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(35), 77b(1), 78c(a)(10) (1964).
9. Id. § 80a-3(a).
10. 419 F.2d at 1261.
I1. No. C-170-68 (D. Utah 1968).
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964).
13. Id. § 77b(l).
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Although the statute does not define an "investment contract," the
courts in establishing guidelines have observed that "Congress did
not intend to adopt a narrow or restrictive concept of [a] security,' 4
that "the reach of the Act does not stop with the obvious and
commonplace,"' 15 and that a security "embodies a flexible rather
than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the
countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of
the money of others on the promise of profits."16 Section 3(a)(8) of
the 1933 Act, however, exempts "any insurance or endowment
policy or annuity contract or optional annuity contract ....
According to the House report, the purpose of this exemption was
to make clear "what is already implied in the act, namely, that
insurance policies are not to be regarded as securities subject to the
provisions of the act."'' Thus, a precise distinction between an
investment contract and an insurance policy is not provided by
statute or legislative history. Insight as to the proper approach to
this problem can be gained by reference to the Act's philosophy that
"full disclosure of the details of the enterprise in which the investor
is to put his money should be made so that he can intelligently
appraise the risks involved."'"
The absence in the 1933 Act of precise definitions of a
"security" or an "insurance contract" has necessitated judicial
interpretation on several occasions, the result of which has been the
formulation of two tests for defining a "security." In the landmark
case of SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co." (VA LIC), the
Supreme Court held that a variable annuity contract is a security
rather than insurance' and that the concept of "insurance" requires
some investment risk-taking on the part of the company and a
guarantee that at least some fraction of the benefits will be payable
in fixed amounts."2 The opinion appears to hold that insurance
14. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338 (1967). For a general discussion of this case
see note 27 infra.
15. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
16. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(8) (1964).
18. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1933).
19. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 77 (1959).
20. 359 U.S. 65 (1959). See generally L. Loss, supra note 2, at 496-501; Martin, The Status
of the Variable Annuity as a Security: A Lesson in Legal Line Drawing, 30 OHIo ST. L.J.
736 (1969); Mearns, The Commission, the Variable Annuity, and the Inconsiderate Sovereign,
45 VA L. REv. 831 (1959); 38 TExAs L. Rav. 248 (1959).




contracts which do not fulfill these two requirements are
"securities." Acknowledging that the variable annuity has elements
of both the conventional annuity and a security, Mr. Justice Brennan
in his concurring opinion reasoned that the policyholder is putting
his funds in the hands of another for investment purposes and that
the disclosure requirements of the securities acts should therefore
apply in order to protect the policyholder.P This approach reflected
the rationale in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,2 an earlier case involving
a contract for the sale of small parcels of a citrus grove development
coupled with a contract for cultivating and marketing the crop and
remitting the net proceeds to the investor, who neither occupied nor
developed the land himself.25 The Howey court defined an
"investment contract" as a "contract, transaction or scheme
whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is
led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a
third party .... -2" The Howey definition was relied on by the
Supreme Court in Tcherepnin v. Knight27 to find that a
withdrawable capital share in a savings and loan association was a
"security." ' The Court reasoned that the requirements under the
Howey test were met since the amount of dividends were tied direct-
ly to the profits of the corporation.P A variation of the VALIC test
was proposed in SEC v. United Benefit Life Insurance Co. 0 which
determined that a more ingenious contract than that in VALIC also
constituted a security despite the reduced risk on the part of the
insured.3' That contract provided for the payment of monthly
premiums into a fund, the major portion of which was invested in
common stocks. The purchaser could at any time withdraw all or
part of his proportionate share of the fund, or, in the alternative, he
could withdraw his cash value which increased from 50 per cent of
the net premiums paid after the first year to 100 per cent of
premiums paid after ten years 2 The Supreme Court noted that this
23. Id. at 85.
24. 328 U.S. 293 (1946): See L. Loss, supra note 2, at 483-89.
25. 328 U.S. at 299-300.
26. Id. at 298-99.
27. 389 U.S. 332 (1967). See generally Note, Securities Regulation: Seventh Circuit Holds
That Withdrawable Capital Accounts Are Not "Securities" Within the Meaning of the
Exchange Act, 1967 DUKE L.J. 1233.
28. 389 U.S. at 338.
29. Id. at 339.
30. 387 U.S. 202 (1967). See generally 17 BUFFALO L. REv. 495 (1968).
31. 387 U.S. at 210-1I.
32. Id. at 205.
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minimum guaranteed return promised by United was so low that the
risk of not being able to meet it through investment was
insignificant 3 The factor which the court appear's to require in
finding a security is lack of a substantial investment risk-taking by
the issueru at least where the issuer offers to the public the prospect
of growth through professionally managed investment35 Thus, a
security is presently held to exist not only where the policyholder
expects profits solely from the efforts of others, but also where the
issuer has failed to assume either some risk or a substantial risk, the
exact extent of the risk required to be assumed by the issuer
depending upon the significance of the profit-sharing representations
which were present in United Benefit. Although an abstract view of
these tests would seem to provide strict requirements for defining a
security, analysis of the individual cases reveals that the definitions
provided by the courts have only been as far reaching as was
required to find a security in the particular factual setting. In
practically all cases the courts have adhered to the doctrine of liberal
interpretation of what constitutes a security.
Basing its decision primarily on the risk-taking test, the Tenth
Circuit in Olpin reasoned that the endorsement was not a "security"
because Ideal bore the entire risk and because the policyholders had
only an indirect interest in the investment experience of Ideal's
managers,3 since the obligation to pay each proportionate share
from the fund was not dependent on Ideal's investment success.37
The court thereby emphasized the inability of Ideal to decrease its
payments to policyholders, if, upon termination of the fund, Ideal
had not realized a profit. The court reasoned further that although
the directors gave consideration to the earnings from the investment
of the additional premiums, the accumulated fund, and the interest
thereon in determining the amount to set aside annually, the amount
placed in that fund was final,3 so that no matter how poorly the
fund performed in the future, the company could never recoup losses
by removing amounts previously committed to the fund. The court
noted that Ideal carried the entire risk that it might not realize from
investment of the fund an aggregate amount sufficient to pay each
33. Id. at 209.
34. Id. at 210.
35. Id. at 211.
36. 419 F.2d at 1262.
37. Id. at 1260-61.
38. Id. at 1261
Vol. 1970:5831
DUKE LA W JOURNAL
policyholder his proportionate share of the fund.3' The court
apparently reasoned that the policyholder's return was not based on
profits since Ideal had no obligation to share with the policyholder
any net profits from investment of the fund.' The court considered
the creation by Ideal of a reserve from which to discharge its
obligations under the endorsement as further evidence that the
endorsement was an insurance contract. Although conceding that the
policy did not provide for fixed amounts of benefits, the Tenth
Circuit attached significance to the provision for a fixed
mathematical method whereby benefits were determined and to the
provision establishing a fixed interest rate.41 The court was
apparently analogizing these provisions to the fixed rates and fixed
methods of return provided by savings accounts which are clearly
not securities.
The Tenth Circuit neither acknowledged that the endorsement
provided two means whereby an Ideal poicyholder anticipated
profits 2 nor analyzed these two provisions in terms of the tests which
the Supreme Court has previously utilized to define a security. By
strictly applying these tests, a court might find that the endorsement
technically failed to fulfill the requirements of each, but such an
approach would ignore the statutory history of liberal
interpretation. 43 The endorsement arguably did not fulfill the
requirements of the Howey" test in that the $1.00 minimum was a
guaranteed return and therefore investor return did not depend solely
on the successful efforts of others. Such a literal interpretation of the
Howey test would, however, ignore the factual background in
Howey, where profits were produced solely by the developer's, and
not by the investor's, efforts. The determination which the Howey
court considered crucial was whose efforts produced the investor's
return and not the extent to which that return depended on the
issuer's efforts, as was the case in Olpin regarding the guaranteed
return. In Olpin as in Howey the purchaser's return was based solely
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1262-63. At the end of the accumulation period the policyholder was entitled to
his proportionate share of the amounts set aside in the fund plus compound interest less
amounts paid to beneficiaries. The proportionate share was the number of units in the policy
of the surviving policyholder divided by the total number of units in all policies.
42. See notes 5-7 supra and accompanying text.
43. See notes 18-20 supra and accompanying text.
44. See notes 28-30 supra and accompanying text.
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on the efforts of others, since the policyholder would realize no
return on his endorsement policy premium unless the issuer was
successful in selling the specified policies. An argument can also be
made that the endorsement was not a security since the issuer
fulfilled the investment risk-taking requirement of VALIC. 5 The
insurance company clearly assumed the risk that payment of the
$1.00 minimum might result in a loss to the company. A question
which the Tenth Circuit never answered but which the United Benefit
Court considered important 6 is whether Ideal actually assumed any
risk under this provision. Ideal had the right to limit the number of
specified policies sold and thus could have adjusted the amount of
premiums paid on the endorsement policy and thereby avoided any
risk whatsoever. If the total of all adjusted premiums collected on
the endorsement policy was greater than the amount of specified life
insurance which Ideal decided to sell divided by $1,000, then Ideal
would have created a guaranteed profit for itself. Because Ideal
could earn interest by placing the fund in a bank account at no risk
and because those who failed to fulfill their obligations under the
endorsement lost their rights in the fund, including the right of
withdrawal of premiums paid, a premium of substantially less than
the adjusted premium might still have involved no risk assumption
by Ideal. Assuming that VALIC's risk assumption requirement was
met, the endorsement must still be analyzed in terms of the
qualifications developed in United Benefit 7 The insurance company
must now assume a substantial risk instead of merely some risk, at
least in the situation where the issuer represents the endorsement as
an opportunity to share in the investment experience of others. As
previously suggested, it is questionable whether Ideal assumed any
risk whatsoever much less a substantial risk. Further, it is doubtful
that a security should not be found to exist where there was a lack of
substantial risk taking by the issuer even though no representation
of its equity nature was made. Although the United Benefit Court
was not faced with that fact situation, liberal interpretation of the
securities acts for the purpose of providing the opportunity for
informed investment on the basis of full disclosure would appear to
mandate such a result. Thus, while a court by strictly construing
Howey, VALIC, and United Benefit might find that the
45. See notes 25-26 supra and accompanying text.
46. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
47. See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
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endorsement did not create a security, the court should consider the
possibility that the endorsement created a return so closely related
-to net profits that the investor should be protected by the securities
laws' disclosure requirements. In combination the two different
aspects of the endorsement created an extremely complicated profit-
making scheme, which is susceptible to extensive manipulation by
the insurance company and which provides for no control by the
investor. Without knowing precisely how the endorsement was
actually treated by Ideal, it is impossible to surmise the exact degree
to which policyholders were sharing in Ideal's profits and assuming
investment risks. Because the provisions could conceivably have
resulted in direct profit sharing and substantial policyholder risk
assumption, the Tenth Circuit, in holding that the endorsement was
not a security, not only has ignored the history of liberal
interpretation regarding the definition of a security but also has
failed to require disclosure in a situation where the investor is faced
with many unknowns.
